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NOTE

Dangerous Criminals or Dangerous
Courts: Foreign Felonies as Predicate
Offenses Under Section 922(g)(1) of the
Gun Control Act of 1968
ABSTRACT

There is currently a split among U.S. Circuit Courts
regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a provision of the Gun Control
Act of 1968 that makes it a crime for any individual "who has
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess or receive
a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce or affecting
interstate commerce." The U.S. Supreme Court will examine the
split later this year when it hears the case of United States v.
Small. The Author argues that the Supreme Court should
determine that Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act of 1968
is ambiguous in its application to foreign felony convictions
because of the legislative history of the Gun Control Act and the
potential constitutional problems that may arise from
More
recognition by U.S. courts of foreign convictions.
specifically, the Author proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court
either affirm the Restatement test adopted by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals and allow for discretionaryinclusion of foreign
felony convictions or hold Section 922(g)(1)'s scope to cover only
domestic felony convictions, which would help pave the way for
Congress to speak more clearly to the issue and conclusively
prohibit dangerous felons, both domestic and foreign, from
owning handguns.
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I. LOCKED AND LOADED: INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

A comparison of the judicial systems of the United States to
other countries reveals that there are major discrepancies in the
methods and procedures used to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights and the adherence to the due process of law.'
Rather than debate which, if any, of these systems best protects basic
individual liberties, this Note uses U.S. constitutional rights as the
baseline. Because of the incongruity between different nations'
judicial systems, any efforts to enforce the disabilities accompanying
foreign convictions in the United States should be carefully
scrutinized to ensure that these convictions comport with our own
system of jurisprudence. One federal statute in particular embodies
the problems raised by foreign convictions: section 922(g)(1) of the
Gun Control Act of 1968 (hereinafter, "Gun Control Act"). There is
currently a circuit split regarding section 922(g)(1), which makes it a
crime for any individual who has been convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year to possess
commerce or in a manner
or receive a gun either through interstate
2
that affects interstate commerce.
This circuit split has arisen due to several conflicting sections
within the Gun Control Act, one of which provides for sentence
enhancement for career criminals. 3 Two of these sections apply to
persons with prior convictions "in any court"; however, one section
makes exceptions for certain state and federal offenses. 4 In addition,
a previous section of the Gun Control Act limited its application to "a
court of the United States or a State or any political subdivision
thereof." 5 Understanding the interpretations of the previous
provision of the Gun Control Act, which expanded the category of
persons covered, is important because both sections 922 and 9246
(often cited along with section 922) affect who may own a handgun

1.
See infra, Part IV.
2.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2003).
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1986) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), which
3.
makes it unlawful for any person who has previously been convicted in "any court" to
"possess ...any firearm").
4.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1), 921(a)(20) (The term "crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" does not include (A) Any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair
trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the
regulation of business practices, or
(B) Any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor
and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.")
5.
6.

See 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1), Pub. L. 90-351 (since repealed).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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and what sentence would be imposed on an individual with a prior
felony conviction found to be in possession of a handgun. 7 The split
specifically arose when courts attempted to decide whether Congress
intended "any court" to include foreign courts or whether Congress
intended these provisions to apply solely to prior domestic
convictions.8 Courts interpreting this statute have debated whether
this statute truly is ambiguous. 9 A case interpreting section
922(g)(1), Small v. United States, is currently on appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 10
This Note analyzes the circuit split surrounding the Gun Control
Act by reviewing related Court of Appeals, the decisions of the courts,
the legislative history of the Gun Control Act and its subsequent
amendments, and the problems raised by using foreign felony
convictions as a basis for further criminal charges or as sentence
enhancers. This Note sides with the decision of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Gayle and argues that the application of section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to foreign felony convictions is
ambiguous and problematic. After examining the legal and political
issues that surround the split, the methods used by the courts in
interpreting these provisions of the Gun Control Act, the problems
inherent in foreign judicial systems and criminal statutes, and
possible alternative solutions, this Note proposes a solution to the
circuit court split. Specifically, this Note proposes that the U.S.
Supreme Court construe section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act
narrowly, and apply it only to prior domestic felony convictions when
it hears United States v. Small.

II.

THE MOTTLED LANDSCAPE: THE DECISIONS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS

The split among the circuits regarding the interpretation of
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act emerged recently. Most of
the cases regarding this provision of the Gun Control Act presented
issues of first impression. The U.S. Supreme Court only recently
granted certiorari to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third

7.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
8.
See, e.g., United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754,
756 (6th Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256 (ambiguity); Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96
9.
(statute unambiguous); Winson, 793 F.2d at 756 (no ambiguity). For a full discussion
of how the courts have decided this issue see infra text accompanying notes 16-72.
10.
Small v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1712 (2004).
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Circuit's decision in United States v. Small." This presents a unique
opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the law as it
currently stands and for Congress to review the Court's
interpretation to avoid establishing bad precedent and the potential
miscarriage of justice. The issue pits the important constitutional
right of an individual to bear arms against the importance of public
safety, a particularly compelling interest in the present context of
heightened security and the threat of terrorism.
A. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first addressed
the application of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to foreign
felony convictions in the 1986 decision United States v.Winson. The
defendant in Winson, charged with violating section 922(g)(1), had
prior convictions in Argentina and Switzerland for the respective
crimes of possessing counterfeit U.S. currency and committing
fraud. 12 In order to determine whether the defendant fell into the
scope of persons covered by § 922(g)(1), the Sixth Circuit examined
both the legislative history of the subsequently repealed section 922
of the Gun Control Act as well as case law regarding a parallel
provision, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202, to ascertain whether the statute
13
should apply because of the defendant's foreign felony convictions.
Before the appeal, the U.S. District Court reasoned in dicta that
allowing foreign convictions to be used under section 922(h) of the
Gun Control Act (the provision prohibiting persons falling under
section 922(g)(1)'s scope from participating in gun trafficking through
interstate commerce), "would require judicial recognition of military
tribunal adjudications in Nicaragua, as well as condemnations of
political prisoners in Poland. Congress could not have intended such
14
an inequitable application of the statute.'
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit found that a parallel
provision, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202, had a narrower scope than the
corresponding language of section 922(g), therefore, section 1202
rightfully included only domestic convictions. 15 Referring to prior
Supreme Court decisions, 16 the Sixth Circuit found that section 1202
was not meant to replace or limit section 922, but rather that each

11.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2003).
12.
Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
13.
Id. at 756.
14.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)-(h).
15.
Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
16.
See e.g., Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 (1983);
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1980); United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 119-21 (1978).
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statute was meant to stand independent from the other. 17
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held that section 922 should apply to
foreign convictions because the court did not perceive "any
congressional intent to exclude from the Act's coverage a class of felon
whose unlawful conduct occurred outside of this country,"1 8 despite
section 1202's express exclusion of foreign convictions. 19 While -the
decision in Winson is arguably no longer valid, because section 1202
was repealed shortly after the Sixth Circuit's decision, 20 the court's
analysis of the language and congressional intent behind section 922
is helpful in comparing its reasoning with the decisions of other
circuits.
B. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Atkins, the defendant was charged with
violating section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act because of a prior
conviction in England for unlawful possession of a firearm with intent
to endanger life. 2 1 Responding to the defendant's claim that Congress
did not intend foreign felonies to be included, the Fourth Circuit
followed the approach taken in Winson and found the statutory
language unambiguous. 22 Reasoning that since 'any' is unmistakable
and in the present case 'court' obviously refers to an English court,
from where the American system of common law originated," the
Atkins court found that section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act
included foreign felony convictions as predicate offenses. 2 3 Citing
Winson, however, the Fourth Circuit made clear that the defendant
had not challenged his English conviction on constitutional or civil
rights grounds. 24 The Fourth Circuit noted that since U.S. common
law stems from English common law, there was likely little difference
in the means by which the conviction was obtained. 25 Since the

17.
Winson, 793 F.2d at 757 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 14774 (1968); Batchelder,
442 U.S. at 121).
Winson, 793 F.2d at 758 ("[W]e can perceive no reason why the commission
18.
of serious crimes elsewhere in the world is likely to make the person so convicted less
dangerous than he whose crimes were committed within the United States.").
19.
See language of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 in Winson, 793 F.2d at 756-78.
20.
See 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (repealed by Act May 19, 1986).
United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1989).
21.
22.
Id. at 96.
Id.
23.
24.
Id. at 96 n.1. If the defendant had been arguing this, it is possible that
under the approach taken by the Restatement and United States. v. Small, 124 S. Ct.
1712 (2004), a court may decide to set aside these convictions (not as invalid, but
similarly so) for sentencing purposes. But see United States v. Custis, 511 U.S. 485
(1994) (holding that foreign convictions may not be attacked at a later sentencing
hearing).
Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96.
25.
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problems arguably inherent with some foreign criminal proceedings
were not argued by the defendant, the Fourth Circuit had no reason
to address the fundamental problem inherent in section 922(g)(1)the potential unconstitutionality of foreign felonies. 26 The Fourth
Circuit failed to address whether the outcome would have been
different had Atkins' prior conviction been from a country with a
judicial system not founded on principles of English common law;
therefore, it serves a limited purpose in the present discussion.
C. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found ambiguity in the Gun Control Act's provision regarding prior
convictions and consequently limited its application to prior domestic
convictions. 27 The defendant in United States v. Concha was
previously convicted of burglary, arson, and of a "Lewd and
28
Lascivious Act Involving Child Under 14" in the United Kingdom.
The government sought sentencing enhancements under 18 U.S.C. §
924(e) because of the application of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun
Control Act.29 Examining the statute in question, the Tenth Circuit
found the plain language to be ambiguous as to whether the language
"inany court" included foreign courts. 30 The Concha court looked to
other related sections of the U.S. Code for guidance and concluded, for
example, that the general approach of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
does not include foreign convictions when computing a defendant's
criminal history. 31 Instead, as many courts in the United States
argue, the Guidelines look to foreign felony convictions as sentence
enhancers. 32 In other words, foreign convictions are used not as the
basis for bringing suit, but as additional proof of the defendant's
33
potential danger to society.
The Tenth Circuit articulated other concerns as well. For
instance, it concluded that the procedural safeguards used in U.S.

26.
Id.
27.
United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000).
28.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
29.
30.
Id. at 1253-54. While the primary focus of this Note is on the statutory
provision in § 922(g)(1), related statutes within the Act raise similar concerns. Id.
31.
Id. at 1254.
32.
See Brief for United States, Small v. United States, 2004 WL 18844488,
*42-43 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-750) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
See id. at *42-43. "While sentencing resulting from foreign convictions are
33.
[sic] not counted in determining a defendant's criminal history category, they may be
considered by the court in assessing the adequacy of the criminal history category to
determine whether an upward departure is warranted." Id.; see, e.g., United States v.
Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fordham, 187 F.3d 344,
347-48 (3d Cir. 1999).
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courts are not necessarily in place in foreign courts to ensure
compliance with the Due Process Clause. 34 As noted above, the Tenth
Circuit also found the relevant provisions of the Gun Control Act to
be ambiguous. Arguments could be made for both interpretations of
"in any court," so the Tenth Circuit decided that the rule of lenity
applied because the statute was criminal in nature. 35 In addition, the
Tenth Circuit noted the problems that would arise by defining prior
foreign felony convictions as applicable predicate offenses under the
Gun Control Act: "[f]oreign criminals are likely to be as dangerous as
domestic criminals"; however "unfair foreign convictions can be
challenged with difficulty, if at all. '3 6 Thus, the Tenth Circuit court
determined that section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act applied only
37
to domestic convictions.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is also notable because, as in Atkins,
the defendant Concha's prior felony convictions were issued by an
English court, a country hardly known for its due process violations.
The Concha court was therefore concerned about all foreign felony
convictions used in U.S. courts, not just convictions from countries
38
with questionable judicial procedures.

34.
Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254. The court pointed to evidence of a dispute
regarding whether Concha had legal counsel for one of his previous convictions. Id. at
1255 n.5.
35.
Id. at 1256.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
This difference between the Atkins and Concha decisions may stem from
the decision in Custis. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994). The Concha
opinion is distinguishable from the decisions in Atkins and Winson because the Concha
court notes that those cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Custis. Id. In interpreting Custis, the Concha court found that the decisions of Atkins
and Winson were no longer viable, because whether or not the previous foreign
convictions had been obtained fairly was not an issue capable of review during
sentencing hearings for 18 U.S.C. § 922; rather, the inquiry must be made on habeas
review. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256. After Custis, the validity of foreign convictions may
not be attacked at a later sentencing hearing; rather, these convictions must be
challenged on habeas review. Id. Consequently, the Concha court held that it does not
matter whether the foreign convictions were obtained fairly for sentencing purposes
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1) -matters which troubled the Winson and
Atkins courts. Id. at 1255-56. The mere fact of a prior felony conviction is enough to
trigger the application of § 922(g)(1). Rather than limit itself to the interpretation in
Atkins, the Concha court looked to the statutory language of § 924(e)(1) (which refers to
§ 922(g)(1)) to determine whether "in any court" should apply to foreign convictions.
See supra Part II.C. The court found that it should not. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256.
This approach may conflict with the approach suggested by the Restatement,
suggesting that the approach adopted by Small may not be tenable. See United States
v. Small, 124 S. Ct. 1712 (2003).
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D. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joined the debate
with its recent decision in United States v. Small.3 9 In Small, the
defendant had prior convictions in Japan for violating the Japanese
Act Controlling the Possession of Firearms and Swords, the
Gunpowder Control Act, and the Customs Act. 40 Each offense is
punishable by imprisonment for a term greater than one year. 41 The
Third Circuit followed the holdings of the Sixth and Fourth Circuits
in Winson and Atkins, respectively, and found that foreign offenses
could indeed serve as the predicate felony conviction necessary for
prosecution under section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act. 42 The
Third Circuit, however, adopted a new approach-the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482. 43 The
Restatement approach adopts, in part, the holding of Duncan v.
Louisiana,44 and adds six discretionary grounds for non-recognition of
foreign judgments that could potentially be used as predicate felony
convictions under the Gun Control Act. 45 The Third Circuit
determined that the Japanese proceedings met the due process
requirements of the American judicial system, and thereby deemed
the foreign convictions applicable as the basis for a charge under
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act. 46 The Third Circuit
examined the district court's analysis and found that none of the
Restatement's grounds for non-recognition of the Japanese conviction
47
were present in the case.
The Third Circuit, citing the Restatement (Third) of Foreign

Relations Law of the United States § 482, held that "a court may
make an explicit finding that the judicial system meets the essential
requirements of fairness, but such a finding may be inferred from a
decision to recognize or enforce the foreign judgment, or to deny

39.
40.

See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 426.

41.

Id.

42.
Id. at 428.
43.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 220-31 (for a detailed discussion of
the Restatement approach).
44.
Id. at 427. (As characterized by Small, the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) held that "the Court must satisfy itself that the foreign conviction
comports with our notions of fundamental fairness as required by the Due Process
Clause.").
45.
See infra note 223.
46.
Small, 333 F.3d at 428. See Part VII for a discussion of what the Japanese
proceeding entailed.
47.
Id. at 428.
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recognition on some other specific ground." 48 Consequently, the
Third Circuit believed that the district court needed to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether one of the Restatement
grounds for non-recognition of a foreign conviction applied. 49
Whether the Restatement approach will be upheld by the Supreme
Court on appeal remains to be seen.
E. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States v. Gayle reinforces the limited application of
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act and is similar to the
approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Concha.50 Gayle concerned
the defendant's prior Canadian conviction for using a firearm while
committing an indictable offense. 51 The district court found that
section 922(g)(1)'s "in any court" phrase applied to the Canadian
conviction, which the government sought to use as a sentence
enhancer. 52 The Second Circuit, however, reversed the district
court's holding, concluded that the language of the statute was
ambiguous, and subsequently reviewed the legislative history of the
Gun Control Act and relevant holdings from other circuits. 53
The Second Circuit noted that, when viewed as part of the Gun
Control Act as a whole, expanding the scope of section 922(g)(1) to
include foreign convictions as permissible predicate offenses would be
inconsistent with the apparent intent of Congress.5 4 In section 921 of
the Gun Control Act, Congress excluded from the scope of the Act
certain federal and state offenses relating to antitrust violations and

Id. at 428. In other words, a court hearing a section 922(g)(1) challenge
48.
does not need to conduct its own inquiry into the validity of the foreign conviction-it
may infer such validity from other sources.
Id.
49.
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
50.
Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1253-56 (10th Cir. 2000).
51.

(1)

See R.S.C. C-46, § 85(1)(a), (3) (1985) (Can.).

Every person commits an offence who uses a firearm

(a) while committing an indictable offence...
(3)
very person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of
an indictable offence and liable
(a) in the case of a first offence, except as provided in paragraph
(b) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years and to a
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year.

Id.
52.
53.
54.

Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
Id. at 91-96.
Id. at 92.
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offenses that, although punishable by terms of more than one year,
were classified as misdemeanors by states. 55 Consequently, antitrust
convictions abroad that carry terms of imprisonment of more than
one year would qualify as valid sentence enhancers or as the requisite
predicate felonies under section 922(g)(1), whereas convictions in U.S.
courts for similar offenses would not qualify as underlying felonies for
56
sentence-enhancement purposes.
The Second Circuit proclaimed that it was the first court to
review comprehensively the legislative history of the Gun Control Act
in an effort to determine what Congress intended. 57 The lower court
concluded that the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Gun
Control Act strongly suggests that Congress did not intend section
922(g)(1) to extend to foreign convictions: "The definition of the term
'felony,' as added by the committee, is a new provision. It means a
Federal crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year and in the case of State law, an offense determined by the laws
of the State to be a felony." 58 Moreover, the Conference Report,

which adopted the House's version of the bill, did not voice opposition
to the Senate's definition of "felony"; instead, the House version
replaced "felony" with "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year." 59 The Second Circuit determined that these two
reports reveal that Congress did not intend the statute to extend to

55.

Id. at 93.

The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"
does not include (C) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices,
restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices, or
(D) Any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and
punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance
with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)
56.
Gayle, 342 F.3d at 93. "[W]e do not understand the logic whereby a person
convicted of an antitrust violation in a foreign country would not be allowed to possess
a firearm, yet a person convicted of the same antitrust violation in the United States
would be allowed to posses a firearm." Id. (citing United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d
1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Most of the other courts found that there was no ambiguity in the statute,
57.
and therefore did not deem it necessary to consult the legislative history of the Act, or
found the legislative history to be un-illuminating. See, e.g., United States v. Winson,
793 F.2d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 1986).
58.
Gayle, 342 F.3d at 94 (citing S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968)).
Id. at 95.
59.
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foreign convictions; Congress simply replaced one word for its
60
commonly understood definition.
The Second Circuit noted that had Congress meant for the
statute to extend to foreign convictions, Congress would have
discussed how to ensure that these foreign convictions were obtained
in a manner sufficient to comport with the U.S. system of
jurisprudence. 61 The Second Circuit found that Congress' silence
regarding this issue "further contributes to the sense that its
meaning is not clear and that it may be appropriate to look beyond
[the statute's] words alone for guidance as to its meaning." 62
Consequently, the court overturned the district court's ruling by
providing for a limited application of section 922(g)(1) to prior felony
63
convictions.
The district court's opinion in United States v. Ingram (United
States v. Gayle on appeal) is notable because rather than focus on the
phrase "in any court" when determining whether a foreign conviction
may serve as a predicate offense, the Ingram court focused instead on
the phrase "crime punishable by .... -"64 Even though the defendant
received a sentence of less than one year, because the defendant's
violation of section 85(1)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code was
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of fourteen years,
the court found that this clearly fell within the "crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ' 65 Even though the
Second Circuit overturned the court's earlier verdict, it did not
explicitly accept or reject this argument. 66 While other courts
considering the application of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act

60.
Id. In its brief, the United States argues that "the Conference Report
expressly rejected the Senate's language and adopted the House bill's definition of
'felony,' which lacked language limiting the qualifying felonies to those entered by state
or federal courts." Brief for United States, supra note 32, at *31-32,
61.
Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
[Congress] would in all likelihood have been troubled by the question whether
the prohibition should apply to those convicted by procedures and methods that
did not conform to minimum standards of justice and those convicted of crimes
that are anathema to our First Amendment freedoms, such as convictions for
failure to observe the commands of a mandatory religion or for criticism of
government.
Id.
62.
Id. at 95-96.
63.
Id. at 96.
64.
See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (What matters when
determining whether an offense comes under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not the actual
sentence the defendant received. Rather, the court must examine the maximum
possible sentence for the offense charged.); United States v. Ingram, 164 F. Supp. 2d
310, 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd sub nom.
65.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Ingram, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
66.
Gayle, 342 F.3d at 89.
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did not discuss the Ingram court's argument, numerous federal
decisions have accepted it. 67 As this Note will discuss, the same
crime may have differing terms of punishment in different
jurisdictions, further resulting in a problematic approach of applying
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to foreign felony
68
convictions.

III.

WHY THE GUN WON'T FIRE: REASONS FOR THE SPLIT

The U.S. Supreme Court should address the reasons underlying
the circuit split when it hears Small. These reasons include whether
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act should be construed
according to its plain and natural meaning or whether the statute is
ambiguous and must be construed otherwise. If the Court finds the
statute to be ambiguous, the Court will need to examine the purpose
of the statute within the context of the Gun Control Act and the
legislative history of the statute. Moreover, it will need to resolve the
Gun Control Act's exclusion of certain state and federal business
affects the
crimes as predicate offenses and how this exclusion
69
felonies.
foreign
to
922(g)(1)
section
of
application
A. NaturalMeaning and Plain Language Evaluation
Ordinarily, a court will look no further than the plain language
of the statute to determine the statute's meaning and applicability. If
the language of a statute "is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning" and "if the law is within the constitutional authority of the
law-making body which passed it," then "the duty of interpretation
does not arise" and "the sole function of the courts is to enforce the

See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, No. 99-30209, 2000 U.S. App.
67.
LEXIS 31915 at *2 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Section 922(g)(1) does not key on the punishment
meted out; it depends on whether the crime was "punishable" for a term exceeding one
year."); see also United States v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Arnold, 113 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 1997). The lack of any case law rejecting
this proposition may be enough to set the maximum sentence as the guideline for
determining whether foreign felony convictions (for sentences exceeding one year) may
qualify for sentence enhancement under § 922(g)(1). This, however, brings up the
problem discussed later as to how to handle instances where the same felony is
punishable by differing lengths of time in different jurisdictions. Id.
See infra part V.
68.
69.
See, Dionna K. Taylor, Comment, The Tempest in a Teapot: Foreign
Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the Federal Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Statute [United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)], 43 WASHBURN L.J. 763,
788-89 (2004). Taylor argues that the statute is not ambiguous, and even if it were, it
should apply to a defendant's foreign felony convictions. Id.
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statute according to its terms. 7 0 The plain meaning of a statute's text
must be given effect "unless it would produce an absurd result or one
manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect."' 71 While a
dictionary definition of the term "any" is all-inclusive, 7 2 the plainmeaning reading does have the potential to lead to "absurd results" if
unconstitutional foreign felonies are included. Treating groups of
felons alike for purposes of section 922(g)(1) without considering the
procedures which produced the sentences cannot be Congress' intent
when enacting the statute. The inquiry must therefore move beyond
a natural meaning and plain language evaluation of the statute to
determine the breadth of section 922(g)(1).
B. Canons of Construction
Courts next look to certain statutory canons of construction to
73
determine the correct meaning of a statute.
1. Inclusion of One Equals the Exclusion of Others
The Inclusion of One Equals the Exclusion of Others statutory
canon of construction provides that the inclusion of one term
necessarily means that Congress intended to exclude other terms that
could apply to the statute at issue. 74 Since section 922(g)(1)'s parent
statute expressly excludes certain domestic felonies, but remains
silent with respect to foreign felonies, the Court could conceivably
apply this canon and rule that Congress intended to exclude certain
domestic felonies while permitting the use of foreign felonies as
predicate offenses. 75 Whether Congress intended this parent statute
to govern the entire Gun Control Act is unclear, however. The parent
statute is one of the few provisions of the Gun Control Act that
actually specifies "federal or state offenses," while other statutes of
the Act permit offenses obtained "in any court. ' 76 Including limiting
language in 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 and in 18 U.S.C. § 921(20), while

70.
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
71.
Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995).
72.
See Taylor, supra note 69, at 777.
73.
United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000).
74.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (It is well settled that
"'where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' (quoting language
used in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
75.
18 U.S.C. § 921(20).
76.
Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(20), 922(g) with § 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)
(repealed).
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including no such language in section 922 of the Gun Control Act,
may show that Congress

intended section 922 to apply to all

77
convictions, including foreign convictions.

The United States government advances this argument in the

Small case. 78 Unfortunately, when Congress significantly altered the
Gun Control Act by incorporating section 1202 into section 921, the
ambiguity was not fixed. Instead, as noted above, the ambiguity
endured. In Concha, the Tenth Circuit determined that by inserting
"any" alongside the limiting language of section 921(20) of the Gun
Control Act, which exempts certain "federal or state offenses" that

otherwise would be included as a predicate felony conviction, is
evidence that Congress had no intention of including foreign felonies
within the Act's scope-such that "in any courts" meant "in any
United States courts. '79 Few circuits, however, have agreed with the
Tenth Circuit's interpretation. As such, this canon of construction
does not adequately resolve the question of Congress' intent on this

issue.
2. Rule of Lenity for Criminal Cases
Because of the traditional notions of fairness and justice
underlying the U.S. judicial system, courts apply the Rule of Lenity to
ambiguous statutes in criminal cases. 80 The Rule of Lenity arises
because courts are not legislators and would rather err on the side of
lenity than incorrectly interpret the will of Congress and unjustly
convict someone. 81 Courts apply the rule of lenity "only when the

77.
78.

See 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Brief for United States, supra note 32, at *29-30.

On two occasions before the present version of Section 922(g)(1) was enacted,
Congress passed laws disqualifying felons from possessing or trafficking in
firearms based only on convictions from state and federal courts.... Congress
specifically deleted those later amendments, as part of a concerted legislative
effort to enlarge [] the group of people coming within the Act's substantive
prohibitions.
Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 343, n.10. (1971)).
United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2000). The
79.
Concha court reasoned that individuals convicted of a crime within the exceptions in
§ 921(20) while abroad would be prohibited from possessing a firearm, whereas that
same individual convicted for the same offense in the United States would not. Id. at
1254.
80.
Id. at 1256 (quoting United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir.
1993)).
81.
Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991)
("[R]ule of lenity requires us to interpret criminal laws so as not to increase the penalty
place on the individual.").
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statutory language is ambiguous" '8 2 and then only if, "after seizing
everything from which aid can be derived, ... no more than a guess
[can be made] as to what Congress intended. '8 3 If this occurs, any
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of a criminal statute is to be
resolved in favor of lenity."8 4 Because section 922 of the Gun Control
Act is both criminal in nature and ambiguous, using the Rule of
Lenity to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the breadth of section
922 of the Gun Control Act may assist a court's effort of interpreting
the statute, and thereby exclude foreign felonies from the scope of
85
section 922(g)(1).
The Tenth Circuit court has already adopted this approach with
regard to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) in Concha.8 6 This may be the best
temporary course of action for courts to follow until either Congress
or the U.S. Supreme Court expressly resolves the ambiguity. It
would ensure that only prior domestic felonies would be used as a
basis for sentence enhancement under section 924(e) or as a predicate
felony under section 922(g)(1), thereby avoiding the problems
associated with including foreign felony convictions as predicate
87
offenses.
C. CongressionalIntent
The circuit courts have also looked to the legislative history of
the Gun Control Act in their efforts to construe the correct
application of section 922(g)(a). The legislative history of the Gun

82.
Brief for United States, supra note 32, at *47 (citing Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980)).
83.
See id. (citing Muscarello v. United States, 523 U.S. 125, 138 (1998)).
84.
Daniel A. Per-Lee, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the "Rule of
Lenity" in the Constructionof CriminalStatutes, 62 L. Ed. 2d 827, 828 (2003).
85.
See id. at 831-32 (describing instances in which the Supreme Court has
held the rule of lenity to apply to gun control legislation) (citing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 55).
According to § 922's predecessor:
Noting that the touchstone of the principle of lenity is statutory ambiguity, the
court state[s] that the plain language, legislative history, and structure of the
Act itself all indicated Congress' plain intent that the fact of a felony conviction
imposes a firearm disability until such time as the conviction is vacated or the
felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action, such as a
qualifying pardon or consent from the Secretary of the Treasury.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1202(a)(1)
86.
Id. While the Concha court was considering the sentence enhancement
factors for repeat offenders (three or more felonies) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the
analysis is identical to the other circuits' attempts to interpret § 922(g)(1). United
States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2000). Both sections refer to prior
felony convictions in "any court." 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e).
87.
See infra Parts VI-V (for a discussion of the potential problems in using
foreign felony convictions to satisfy the requirements of the statute).
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Control Act does not adequately support the use of foreign felony
convictions as predicate offenses under section 922(g)(1).
1. Policy Goals and the Purpose of the Gun Control Act
During the 1960s, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act (hereinafter, the "Safe Streets Act") in response
to the nationwide epidemic of crime. The Safe Streets Act was passed
during a turbulent time in U.S. history, following the assassinations
of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and
when tempers were rising on college campuses and cities across the
country over deteriorating race relations and the growing U.S.
presence in Vietnam.8 8 As the Amendments within House Report 901577 set out, "[t]his increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and the
growing use of firearms in violent crime clearly attest to a need to
strengthen Federal regulation of interstate firearms traffic. '8 9 Unlike
today, the threat of attack from foreign terrorists was not the driving
force behind this legislation.9" Thus, the overarching purpose of the
Safe Streets Act was to keep handguns out of the hands of dangerous
or potentially dangerous individuals. 91 This continues to be a
legitimate concern, since according to the Bureau of Justice, in 2002,
sixty-seven percent of all murders, forty-two percent of all robberies,
and nineteen percent of all reported aggravated assaults 'were

88.
Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does 'Any" Mean "All" or Does "Any"Mean "Some"?
An Analysis of the "Any Court" Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal Act and
Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 147,
169-71 (Fall 2002); see also ALEXANDER BLOOM, TAKIN' IT TO THE STREETS: A SIXTIES
READER (2003); TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1993). It is
also of note that the Act was passed on June 6, 1968, the same day that the
announcement of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy was announced in
the House. Basler, supra, at 169.
89.
See 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4412. These Amendments were introduced
subsequent to the enactment of HR 5384 in Title IV to the omnibus crime bill, HR
5037, on June 19, 1968. Thus, the Gun Control Act was already in effect when these
Amendments were voted upon.
90.
See Taylor, supra note 69, at 782 (referencing the Firearms Fairness and
Security Act, S. 2102, 108th Cong. 2(2)(1)(B) (2004)). This Amendment has two Senate
co-sponsors, which hardly shows that even the current Congress is not solidly behind
the notion of including foreign felony convictions within § 922(g)(1)'s ambit. Id.
91.
H.R. 90-1577 cites handgun statistics in the general statement prior to the
amendments:
Handguns, rifles, and shotguns have been the chosen means to execute threequarters of a million people in the United States since 1900. The use of
firearms in violent crimes continues to increase today. Statistics indicate that
50 lives are destroyed by firearms each day .....No civilized society can ignore
the malignancy which this senseless slaughter reflects.
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4413.
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committed with a firearm. 92 Use of firearms by criminals has,
however, declined since 1993. 93 Regardless, the use of firearms in
crimes still poses a significant threat to the safety of U.S. citizens.
If read at its broadest level of abstraction, the purpose of the
Gun Control Act (and the Safe Streets Act) would appear to include
foreign felony convictions. The United States government advances
this argument in its brief in Small, asserting that if foreign
convictions were entirely excluded
then those convicted of murder, rape, armed robbery, and terrorism
overseas could freely possess, receive, ship, and transport firearms
within the United States, while a person convicted domestically of
94
or possessing a
tampering with a vehicle identification number,
'three-neck, round-bottom flask,' 95 could be barred for life from
96
possessing firearms.

This is clearly inconsistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the
Gun Control Act. The United States' argument, however, is slightly
exaggerated. While it may appear unfair for the same class of
individuals to be treated differently on the basis of where their
conviction was obtained, section 922(g)(1)'s application is based on
the mere fact of conviction-arguably, irrespective of the source of the
conviction. The prior felony conviction is an essential element of the
statutory offense; if there is no valid felony conviction, then an
individual cannot be convicted of violating section 922(g)(1) of the
Gun Control Act. It is therefore important to determine whether
Congress intended to include foreign felonies within the scope of
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act.
Numerous cases have considered Congress's intent when it
enacted the Gun Control Act. For instance, "[t]he Dickerson court
found that Congress determined that the best way to prevent crime
was to keep firearms away from certain classes of persons, namely
those who have been convicted of serious crimes." 97 The court in
Barrett v. United States found that "the very structure of the 1968 Act
demonstrates that Congress ... sought broadly to keep firearms away

92.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics: Crimes Committed with Firearms,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/glance/guncrime.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2004).

See generally Bureau of Justice Firearms and Crimes Statistics, available
93.
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslguns.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
94.
See 18 U.S.C. § 511(a).
See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6).
95.
See Brief for United States, supra note 32, at *26.
96.
460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983).
97.
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from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and
dangerous." 98
The Dickerson decision specifically addresses Congress' concern
with the utility and public policy concerns of including foreign felony
convictions as predicate offenses under the Gun Control Act. The
Dickerson court was concerned that state provisions that expunged
prior convictions would hamper Congress' attempt to prevent and
deter crime by precluding federal courts (and other state courts) from
using now-expunged convictions to serve as either a basis for
conviction or as a basis for sentence enhancement under sections such
as 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) of the Gun Control Act. 99 Consequently,
that Dickerson court found that Congress could not have meant for
states to be able to modify which prior convictions counted toward
sentence enhancement under federal law.100 This is an important
distinction because the split is among not only the federal Courts of
Appeals, but also the federal district courts.
After focusing on the statute's language and legislative history,
the Barrett court concluded that Congress' purpose in enacting the
Gun Control Act was to keep firearms away from "potentially
irresponsible persons, including convicted felons." 10 1 Thus, the fact
that a conviction may have been obtained through unconstitutional
methods would be irrelevant. The mere fact of conviction becomes
determinative, rather than the mechanics of the felony proceeding. If
the individual committed a felony, or a crime that a foreign court
found to be a felony, then he is prohibited from possessing a firearm
by section 922 of the Gun Control Act because he is "potentially"
irresponsible. If the U.S. Supreme Court adopts this liberal view, the
foreign felony argument would be moot.
The more important question that Congress did not consider was
whether felons convicted abroad are as dangerous as felons convicted
in U.S. courts. The Tenth Circuit determined that felons convicted
abroad are as dangerous as those convicted in the United States in
Concha.102 Several law review articles have also addressed this

98.
423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976). The Barrett Court was interpreting a different
section of the Gun Control Act, § 922(h); however, the Court discussed at length the
history and purposes of the legislation.
99.
See supra notes 6-9.
100.
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119. Other courts have noted that, "in the absence
of plain indication to the contrary ... it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a
statute that it does not intend to make its application dependent on state law." NLRB
v. Natural Gas Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971) (quoting NLRB v. Randolph
Electric Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62-63 (4th Cir. 1965)).
101.
Barrett, 423 U.S. at 220. (Emphasis added.)
102.
233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) ("foreign criminals are likely to be as
dangerous as domestic criminals").
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question. 103 In the context of state repeat-offender statutes, one
author argues that "[o]ne who violates laws in another country is just
as dangerous in the future as one who violates laws in the United
States and is therefore equally in need of rehabilitation." 104
Accordingly, there is reason to infer that Congress intended section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to apply to foreign felons as well as
domestic felons because all felons are felons, regardless of where the
person committed the felony. The classic Shakespearean adage
would clearly apply: "[w]hat's in a name? that which we call a rose /
by any other name would smell as sweet."10 5 No matter how the
conviction was obtained, the fact of conviction should be enough.
Nevertheless, as the debate within the Committee report shows,
"felon" is simply a label for a class of offenses arbitrarily decided by
each state and, indeed, each country.
For purposes of section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act, a felony is a "crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."'1 6 This definition sits
independent of the purpose of the Gun Control Act, but also fits
squarely within it. If Congress intended section 922(g)(1) to extend to
foreign felony convictions, so long as these convictions constituted
crimes "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,"
then these convictions would be a valid foundation or sentence
10 7
If
enhancer for charges under sections 922 and 924, respectively.
Congress intended the Gun Control Act to apply only to individuals
convicted within the United States, the Act also achieves this
purpose. Therefore, an examination of the aim of the Gun Control
Act does not clear up the debate over the use of foreign felonies to
prevent individuals from possessing handguns.
2. Exclusion of Certain State and Federal Business Crimes
In Small, the United States argues that even though the Gun
Control Act exempts certain state and federal business crimes,
Congress still contemplated the Safe Streets Act to include all foreign
felony convictions. In its brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the United
States asserts that

103.
See e.g. Taylor, supra note 69; see also Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of
Foreign Country Convictions as Predicatesfor Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist
Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134 (1994).
104.
Glashausser, supra note 103, at 151, 155.
105.
Romeo and Juliet Act II, Scene II, lines 47-48, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Craig, W.J. ed., Oxford University Press 1914), available at
www.bartleby.com/70/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
106.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). But see 18 U.S.C. § 921 (excluding certain
antitrust convictions).
107.
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e).
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Congress carved out from Section 922(g)'s prohibition only business
crimes involving forms of regulation with which Congress was quite
familiar. Due to the variety and disparity in how other nations define,
label, and classify their penal provisions, however, Congress could be
less confident that analogous conduct in foreign jurisdictions would
lead to felony convictions in the first place, or that granting the
108
exclusion would exempt only relatively non-dangerous individuals.

To include foreign felonies because "all felons are felons" and are
therefore potentially dangerous, but to exclude certain domestic
felonies, is an absurd result. The United States' argument is based
on the propositions that Congress is unfamiliar with the judicial
systems of other nations and that conduct abroad may not be truly
criminal if committed in the United States.' 0 9 Congress and the
courts are familiar with the white-collar crimes excepted from the
scope of the Gun Control Act. 110 Congress' unfamiliarity with similar
crimes in foreign countries, however, should lead to the exclusion of
those same crimes under section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act.
This is the predominant reason why foreign felonies should be
excluded from section 922(g)(1)'s scope. Conflicting outcomes for
conviction of the same prior offense may ultimately be the key issue
to the resolution of the circuit split.
3. Legislative History
As discussed above, the relatively sparse legislative history
available regarding 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 1202(a)(1) renders it
difficult to discern Congress' purpose in enacting the statute. Section
1202(a)(1) passed "with little discussion, no hearings, and no
report."1'11 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in United States v. Bass,
however, Title VII (including section 1202) was a last-minute Senate
addition to the Safe Streets Act. 112 Indeed, the Gun Control Act itself
grew out of and was enacted as a series of amendments to the Safe
Streets Act. 113 When Title VII was repealed in 1986 and superseded
by the more current version of 18 U.S.C. § 921, one would assume
that this new version would clear up any lingering ambiguities
surrounding the two former sections. Although the new version

108.
Brief for United States, supra note 32, at *23-24
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
13 A.L.R. FED. 103.
112.
See William R. Vizzard, Note, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 79 n.44 (1999).
113.
See Century v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Vt. 1971).
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presumably should have faced closer scrutiny in Committee
hearings, 1 14 that was not the case.
Congress' concern in enacting section 921 of the Gun Control Act
(including section 922(g)(1))-namely, the problem of convicted felons
possessing handgun-has not changed since it enacted the Safe
Streets Act in 1968.115 The Senate Report would have restricted the
scope of the Gun Control Act to "a crime of violence punishable as a
felony." 116 The Conference Report, however, adopted the House's
language that the Gun Control Act was applicable to "a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one (1) year." 117
Moreover, this Report, from which the final language of the Gun
Control Act was adopted, excluded certain offenses that state law
classified as misdemeanors, despite being offenses punishable by
imprisonment for over one year.1 18 Thus, when considering foreign
statutes whose offenses are punishable by imprisonment for over a
year, whether the offenses are classified as felonies or not becomes
important. 119

See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); see also 13 A.L.R. FED. 103
114.
(discussing the legislative history of the Act).
115. When Congress enacted [18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.] it was concerned with
the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to
those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest.... The
principal purpose of federal gun control legislation, therefore, was to curb
crime by keeping 'firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to
possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.'
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc. 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983) (quoting Huddleston v.
United States, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 1268 (1974)).
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428; see also S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968).
116.
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428.
117.
Definition of crimes.118.
Under both the House bill and the Senate amendment the crimes were defined
to exclude Federal and State offenses relating to antitrust violations and
similar business offenses. The conference substitute adopts the crime referred
to in the House bill (one punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year) but
excludes from that crime any State offense not involving a firearm or explosive,
classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor, and punishable by a term
of imprisonment of not more than two years.
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428. It is noteworthy to mention that the bill does put a twoyear cap on the offenses which may be classified as misdemeanors under state law. It
is also noteworthy that the Senate's definition makes certain provisions for what would
constitute an equivalent felony under state law, without making such a clarification for
foreign convictions. Presumably, foreign convictions would be the more problematic
area for courts to interpret for charges under § 922(g)(1).
The issue that arises then is that not all countries and jurisdictions use the
119.
term "felony" or "misdemeanor" when describing a class of crimes-if a foreign country
were to classify an offense punishable by imprisonment for over one year as a
misdemeanor, would it also be excludable under the statute? Arguably yes, though this
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While the Safe Streets Act (which includes the Gun Control Act)
now had a class of offenses to which it would apply, a further problem
with the application of the Safe Streets Act arose with the passage of
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in 1984.120 Several sections
within the Safe Streets Act, specifically, the Gun Control Act and the
ACCA, arguably conflicted: namely, Title VII of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C.
12 1
App. § 1202 (a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which is part of Title IV.
At the time of its passage, section 1202(a)(1) applied to "any person
who has been convicted by a court of the United States or a State or
any political subdivision thereof of a felony .... ,,
122
Congress,
however, repealed the 1984 Amendment in 1986 with an updated
version of section 921 of the Gun Control Act. 123 This change merged
the provisions of the ACCA into the Gun Control Act. In doing so,
however, Congress failed to include any similar language relating to
domestic versus foreign felony convictions in section 921, generating
confusion regarding the use of foreign felony convictions as predicate
offenses under the Gun Control Act. 124 For example, in hearings on
the 1986 amendments, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms noted that "the bill provides that what constitutes a
felony conviction would be determined by the law of the jurisdiction
where the conviction occurred. This would require the Bureau to
examine the peculiar laws of each State to determine whether a
person is convicted for Federal purposes.' 2 5
Congress' passage of H.R. 4322 in 1986, which combined the
provisions of Title I of the Gun Control Act (section 922(g)) and Title
VII of the ACCA (section 1202), merely noted that a category of
persons excluded from possessing guns are those "under indictment
for or convicted of a felony."'126 Thus, while the narrower language of

is an additional problem that courts will face should they decide to find that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) unambiguously includes foreign "felonies."
120.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-1073 (1984) (regarding bill H.R. 6248, to amend title
VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
121.
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc. 460 U.S. 103, 105 (1983) (referencing
82 Stat. 226 and 82 Stat. 1214). "Title VII makes it unlawful for any person 'who is
under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' to ship, transport, or receive any firearm
or ammunition in interstate commerce." Id.
122.
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1), Pub. L. 90-351. See also Report 98-1073,
regarding H.R. 6248, "Section 2 amends 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) by adding a new
offense proscribing any felon who has been convicted previously of three felonies for
robberies or burglaries (either Federal or State) from ......
123.
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (2003); Pub. L. 99-308, § 104(b).
124.
See supra note 118.
125.
See Legislation to Modify the 1968 Gun Control Act, Hearings, Committee
on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 99th Congress, Part 2, Serial No. 131,
p.1170-71, Memorandum to Assistant Secretary from the Director of the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, February 10, 1986 (emphasis added).
126.
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327.
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section 1202 was combined with the broader language of section 922,
a problem arose regarding whether felonies, for the purpose of this
Gayle, the
statute, were limited to state and federal offenses. In
127
unclear.
remains
question
this
that
noted
Circuit
Second
4. Pending Legislation
Pending legislation in the House regarding section 922(g) of the
Gun Control Act specifically suggests amending the statute to
prevent gun possession by individuals who, as juveniles, committed a
crime that otherwise would have qualified as a crime of violence for
purposes of the statute. 128 The relevant language is no longer "in any
court," but rather "in a court." 129 This minor change does not suggest
congressional intent one way or the other whether to include foreign
felony convictions. There is also pending legislation in the Senate
regarding section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act, which intends to
130
expand the scope of the section to apply to foreign felons.
To review, assuming that Congress intended foreign felonies to
serve as a predicate offense for section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control
Act, under both the Restatement approach (including Small) and the
view of the Gayle, Atkins, and Winson courts, two major issues arise
when considering foreign felonies: First, what should a U.S. court do
when confronted with a conviction based on a crime which, while
criminal abroad, is legal in the United States? Second, how should a
U.S. court decide whether a foreign conviction was obtained through
judicial proceedings that comport with our own? 131 The U.S.
Supreme Court must address these issues when it renders its
decision in the Small case.

127.
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Taylor,
supra note 69 (for a discussion of the legislative history of the Act in reference to the
Gayle decision). The Gayle court also found that the Conference Report, while adopting
the House's version of the bill, did not disagree or conflict with the Senate Report's
limitation of felonies to include only convictions in domestic courts. Gayle, 342 F.3d at
95.
128.
2003 Cong. U.S. H.R. 3411 (Introduced in House October 30, 2003).
129.
Id.
130.
2003 Cong. U.S. S. 2102 (Introduced in Senate February 23, 2004). This
bill has two co-sponsors, was read twice, and is pending review in the Committee of the
Judiciary.
131.
See Taylor, supra note 69, at 792. The author argues that, in reference to
the decision in Gayle, the burden should be on the party challenging the inclusion and
use of the foreign conviction to show how the conviction was obtained by methods
contrary to fundamental due process and other unconstitutional means. While this
proposal would relieve courts of the trouble and problems of sifting through foreign
judicial material, the cost to the defendant would substantially increase. Furthermore,
several courts have noted that the difficulty of challenging these foreign convictions is
difficult, if they can successfully be challenged at all. See United States v. Concha, 233
F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000).
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IV. MAKING A RUN FOR THE BORDER: FOREIGN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

There are undoubtedly many crimes which, while criminal in
foreign countries, are either not crimes in the United States or are
treated differently by U.S. courts. The United States has long prided
itself on being the "land of the free," and consequently has placed few
132
restrictions on the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion.
This is not the case in many other countries, however. While most of
the offenses that qualify as felonies under U.S. law also qualify as
felonies under many foreign felony statutes, problems arise with both
133
the context of how these foreign felony convictions are obtained
and with how to proceed when foreign felony statutes make certain
conduct felonious that does not merit equivalent treatment in the
134
United States.
A. ProceduralFairnessand Due Process Concerns
Both the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause ensure basic rights to the accused: the right to legal
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to
procedural and substantive due process. 135 Procedural due process
sets certain guidelines that the government must follow in order to
respect the constitutionally protected liberties afforded individuals
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
l3 6
Amendments.
The same constitutional protections, however, are not
universally accepted around the world. The same crime may be tried
differently in different countries and in a manner contrary to the
public policy of the United States. For example, one author noted
that in the developing area of Chinese sports law, there is no
procedural right to due process or right to judicial evaluation of
37
disputes arising under Chinese laws:'
The Sports Law itself fails to articulate any rights for athletes; human
rights do not qualify for competition with nationalist aspirations in the
bold new program of Chinese sports. Nor does the law explicitly protect

132.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
133.
See infra Part IV(A).
134.
See infra Part IV(B).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X, XIV.
135.
136.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
137.
James A.R. Nafziger & Li Wei, Note, China's Sports Law, 46 AM. J. COMP.
LAW 453, 454 (1998) (From a Western viewpoint, what is missing in the Sports Law is,
first, an identification of the rights of athletes, for example, to enjoy impartial rules of
eligibility and due process; and, second, any recognition that adjudication can play a
positive role by providing a remedy in exceptional cases involving the most serious
breaches of fairness and justice.).
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a right to challenge decisions of the newly empowered sports
associations, although it is possible that athletes will have standing to
do so in the mediation and arbitration body under the Sports Law. 138

While the author notes that there is nothing intrinsically unfair with
the Chinese laws themselves, the lack of due process in proceedings
against athletes where the underlying conduct or resulting sentence
amounted to a felony under U.S. law would presumably be a point of
contention in determining whether a foreign conviction in China
would satisfy the requirements of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control
Act. 139 In addition, the punishment meted out would have to meet
the definition of what constitutes a felony under section 922(g)(1) in
140
order to count as a predicate offense.
The new Palestinian judicial system also suffers from due
For
process and other basic constitutional protection problems.
example, in Gaza and the West Bank, many individuals are
incarcerated for a significant period of time without receiving legal
counsel. 141
Moreover, oftentimes individuals accused are not
informed of their right to counsel.14 2 Police officers involved may
delay advising the accused of their rights until after the prosecutor
interrogates the accused and takes a statement. 143 Considering these
violations of basic due process, it can hardly be said that persons
charged under Palestinian law are tried fairly according to U.S.
standards of justice. This argument parallels the one advanced in
Concha by the Tenth Circuit, where the court pointed to evidence
that the defendant may not have had legal counsel in his prior felony
proceeding in the United Kingdom. 144 The Tenth Circuit found this
145
abuse represented a clear violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Many countries' systems would presumably meet the
constitutional requirements for basic procedural due process,
however. The arguments against including felony convictions from
these countries would be moot. For example, criminal defendants in
the Philippines are afforded similar protections as those provided in

138.
Id. at 465.
Id.
139.
140.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ([any] crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year).
Hiram E. Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, Note, The PalestinianLegal Study:
141.
Consensus and Assessment of the New PalestinianLegal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L. REV.
375, 423 (1997) (In the West Bank, a suspected criminal is not entitled to be appointed
defense counsel unless charged with either a capital or life sentence or sentence.). Id.
at 415.
142.
Id. at 416.
143.
Id. "Accused persons are often held for three or four days without an
opportunity to communicate with their defense counsel." Id.
144.
United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1255, n.5 (10th Cir. 2000).
145.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the United States. 146 In People of the Philippines v. Lopez, for
instance, the Philippine Supreme Court overturned a criminal
conviction because the evidence used was obtained improperly, in
violation of the Philippine Constitution. 147 Thus, some foreign felony
convictions could be properly used as the basis for a conviction under
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act.
The question of whether wholly to exclude foreign felony
convictions or, alternatively, to selectively disregard convictions from
certain countries known to have judicial systems contrary to our own,
is one that the U.S. Supreme Court must address.
1. Foreign Convictions in U.S. Courts
The decision of Neprany v. Kir indicates that even though some
crimes are not necessarily crimes in the United States, 148 full faith
and credit should be given to the foreign judgment by U.S. courts so
long as domestic public policy is "not contravened" by the foreign
law. 149 The only limiting factors appear to be traditional common law
principles embodied in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
of Law § 482.150 Such limitations include non-recognition where "the
procedure implemented in the foreign court denied the defendant
such fundamental American rights as access to counsel, discovery,
impartial tribunals and judicial review" 15 1 as well as limitations
152
based on public policy.

146.
See e.g., United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
People of the Philippines v. Lopez, 1994 Philippine S.Ct. LEXIS 5145 (1994)).
147.
Id. at 173. The Lopez court highlighted the basic tenets of the Philippine
legal system, including "the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the duty of
the arresting officers under the Philippine Constitution." Id.
See infra Part VI.B. (for a discussion of how the Restatement approaches
148.
the "public policy" problem).
149.
Neprany v. Kir, 5 A.D. 2d 438, 439 (N.Y. 1958). In Neprany, the defendant
was convicted under a Canadian statute for seduction and criminal conversation. Id.
New York had previously abolished these crimes as causes of action. The Court,
however, nevertheless held that "the comity of nations called for giving full effect to the
foreign judgment in question." Id. The Court found that New York public policy was
not offended by giving effect to the enforcement of the Canadian judgment. Id.
150.
See infra note 223.
See Brian Richard Paige, Note, Foreign Judgments in American and
151.
English Courts: A Comparative Analysis, 26 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 591, 603 (2003) for a
discussion of grounds of non-recognition in U.S. Courts.
152.
Id.; see also Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 238 (Md. 1997). An
English libel judgment was not recognized under state law because the Maryland
defamation law was "totally different" from English defamation law in:
virtually every significant respect and that the differences were rooted in
history and fundamental public policy differences concerning freedom of the
press and speech. The court noted that the principles governing defamation
actions under English law were so contrary to Maryland defamation law and to
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Courts, therefore, would have the ability to set aside foreign
judgments under the Restatement, but the standards by which courts
must do so are applied on a case-by-case basis. Interpreting the
language of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to include
judgments of foreign courts, while not necessarily abhorrent to
domestic civil procedure, will likely result in inconsistent recognition
of foreign judgments.
More important, as Karen E. Minehan notes, "no U.S. court has
1 53
enunciated a clear standard for using the public policy exception.'
Instead
[U.S.] courts have enforced foreign judgments based on causes of action
that either do not exist under or vary from U.S. law. U.S. courts have
enforced foreign damage awards that would not be granted in the
United States. U.S. courts have thus exhibited a profound tendency
towards the liberal enforcement of foreign judgments that would not
15 4
normally be awarded in U.S. courts.

While purely hypothetical, an interesting example of the procedural
problems inherent in deciding that section 922(g)(1) should apply to
foreign felony convictions occurred within the last decade. The
caning of an eighteen-year-old U.S. citizen, Michael Fay, for violating
Singapore's vandalism and mischief laws received worldwide
attention. 155 While the Singapore Constitution recognizes such
fundamental constitutional issues as due process and equal
protection, it affords no protection against cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment. The offense for which Fay was caned meets
the statutory requirements for a "crime punishable by imprisonment
for one year or more," 156 and thus would qualify as a prior felony
under § 922(g)(1).
While much of the Singapore Constitution
comports with traditional U.S. notions of jurisprudence, this
particular punishment offends U.S. notions of "cruel and unusual

the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law, that appellant's
judgment should be denied recognition under principles of comity.
Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 238.
153.
See Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of
ForeignJudgments: Necessary or Nemesis? 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 799
(1996).
154.
Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
155.
See Firouzeh Bahrampour, Note, The Caning of Michael Fay: Can
Singapore'sPunishment Withstand the Scrutiny of InternationalLaw? 10 AM. U. INT'L
L. & POLY 1075 (1995). This Note does not go into much discussion as to whether the
judicial proceedings themselves were impartial and constitutional, questions which lie
at the heart of this issue. Id.
156.
Id. at 1080; see also Vandalism Act, ch. 108, § 3 (1966) (Sing.) (The
maximum legal sentence for each count of vandalism could consist of a fine of two
thousand Singaporean dollars or a prison sentence of three years, and caning of three
to eight strokes.).
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punishment," prohibited under the U.S. Constitution. 157 If Fay were
to carry a handgun while traveling in the United States, it is possible
that his prior felony conviction could be used under section 922(g)(1)
for his conviction, even though this prior felony is arguably
unconstitutional.
2. Religious Tribunals
Some jurisdictions base their criminal code on religious, rather
than civil or moral, codes. For example, in Malaysia, the Syariah
courts have criminal jurisdiction over persons of Islamic faith,
"[p]rovided that such jurisdiction shall not be exercised in respect of
any offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three
years or with any fine exceeding five thousand ringgit or with
158
whipping exceeding six strokes or with any combination thereof.'
The Malaysian Constitution, for instance, permits the Syariah court
to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which a person teaches doctrines
contrary to Islamic law. 159 Punishment for this violation could be
imprisonment for up to three years. 160 Such a crime would appear to
be at odds with U.S. laws; however, it seems typical of religious
tribunals. Since persons convicted of offenses punishable in excess of
one year would fall under the scope of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun
Control Act, 161 this casts further doubt about whether section
922(g)(1) should be interpreted to include foreign felony convictions.
B. Differing Definitions of Crime and Length of Punishment
Some crimes necessarily contradict public policy in nearly all
countries. Murder is one such crime. In Malaysia, the punishment

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
157.
Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965 (Act 355.2), Laws of
158.
Malaysia, Golden's Federal Statutes (2003).
Syariah Criminal Offenses (Federal Territories) Act, 1997 (Act 559.4), Laws
159.
of Malaysia, Golden's Federal Statutes (2003). False doctrine states:
(1) Any person who teaches or expounds in any place, whether private or
public, any doctrine or performs any ceremony or act relating to the religion of
Islam shall, if such doctrine or ceremony or act is contrary to Islamic Law or
any fatwa for the time being in force in the Federal Territories, be guilty of an
offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand
ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to whipping
not exceeding six strokes or to any combination thereof.
Syariah Criminal Offenses (Federal Territories) Act, 1997 (Act 559.4), Laws of
Malaysia, Golden's Federal Statutes (2003).
Syariah Criminal Offenses (Federal Territories) Act, 1997 (Act 559.4), Laws
160.
of Malaysia, Golden's Federal Statutes (2003).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
161.
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for murder is death. 16 2 Punishment for "culpable homicide," where
the death is caused with the intention of causing death, is punishable
by imprisonment of up to twenty years and a fine. 16 3 In the United
States, each state determines the punishment for murder. 164 So long
as the punishment for the same crime meets the statutory definition
of a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
165
year," no problem arises.
Problems do arise, however, when either the length of the
punishment does not meet the statutory requirements of section
922(g)(1) in one country but does in another, or where certain crimes
in some countries are not criminal in others. In Malaysia, for
example, carnal intercourse against the order of nature is punishable
by imprisonment for twenty years and whipping. 166 Presumably,
such a law is at odds with the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
overturning a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy. 16 7 In a
pre-Lawrence state, a conviction in Malaysia for carnal intercourse
against the order of nature would satisfy the requirements of section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act, whereas a conviction for the same
offense in Texas would not qualify as a predicate offense under
section 922(g)(1). 168 This possibility of differing results under
essentially the same statute is precisely why the ambiguity of section
922(g)(1) must be resolved.

162.
Penal Code, 1997 (Act 574.302), Laws of Malaysia, Golden's Federal
Statutes (2003) (prescribing that "[w]hoever commits murder shall be punishable with
death").
163.
Penal Code, 1997 (Act 574.304), Laws of Malaysia, Golden's Federal
Statutes (2003).
164.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (2003) (Every person guilty of murder
in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25
years to life.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2003) (Murder committed with
deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or
in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27
(Consol. 2003) (When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in
section 125.27 of this chapter, the court shall, in accordance with the provisions of
section 400.27 of the criminal procedure law, sentence the defendant to death, to life
imprisonment without parole in accordance with subdivision five of section 70.00 of
this chapter or to a term of imprisonment for a class A-I felony other than a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole, in accordance with subdivisions one through three of
section 70.00 of this chapter.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-17 (2003) (noting that firstdegree murder is punishable by either life imprisonment or death).
165.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
166.
Penal Code, 1997 .(Act 574.377(b)), Laws of Malaysia, Golden's Federal
Statutes (2003).
167.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 U.S. 2472 (2003).
168.
Under Texas law, a Class C misdemeanor does not meet § 922(g)(1)'s
requirement of a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."
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Another example in which conduct that is criminal in a foreign
country is not criminal in the United States is flag-desecration for
political purposes. In China, "insulting" or "scraping" or otherwise
"trampling" the national flag or national emblem is punishable by a
term of imprisonment of up to three years. 169 Flag desecration is not
an offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment in the
United States, however. 170 Thus, a situation similar to the abovedescribed example regarding convictions for violations of same-sex
sodomy statutes occurs. Presuming that an individual is convicted in
China of burning the Chinese national flag, he or she would be
considered a felon for purposes of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control
Act, and would therefore be prohibited from owning a firearm, while
that same individual would not be convicted in a U.S. court for the
same offense, and therefore would not be prohibited from owning a
firearm under section 922(g)(1).
Consequently, if courts assume that section 922(g)(1) of the Gun
Control Act includes foreign felonies, but the length of punishment
for the same crime in the United States is different from the length of
punishment abroad for the same crime, an inconsistency in justice
would occur. If a felony abroad carries a sentence of more than one
year while the same offense in the United States carries a sentence of
less than a year, a discrepancy in the application of section 922(g)(1)
of the Gun Control Act arises. This is the case, for example, with the
Malaysian and Texas same-sex sodomy laws, and potentially the case
with respect to the Chinese and U.S. flag-desecration laws. 171
Because of the longer sentence abroad, a defendant would then suffer
not only from additional time served in prison, but also be prevented
from or possibly prosecuted for owning a gun.
There are other statutes where discrepant sentences could lead
to different applications of section 922(g)(1) as well. In China, for

169.
See William W. Van Alstyne, Note, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Whose
Rule of Law? 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623, 636 (2003) (citing Xing Fa [Criminal
Code] art. 299 (P.R.C.), translated in The 1997 Criminal Code of the People's Republic
of China 33 (Wei Luo trans., Chinese Law Series, vol. 1, 1998) ("Anyone who
deliberately insults the national flag or national emblem of the [PRC] in a public place
with methods such as burning, destroying, scraping, trampling, etc., shall be sentenced
to a fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, [or] criminal detention, [or]
deprivation of political rights.").
18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(1) (2004) ("Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces,
170.
physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of
the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both.") (emphasis added). Moreover, U.S. courts have construed that statute's
application very narrowly in order to reconcile its restriction on First Amendment
freedoms with the governmental interest in preserving a national emblem. See
Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (narrowly construing the
predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 700 to avoid possible conflict with the First Amendment).
See infra text accompanying notes 164-68.
171.
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instance, the punishment for counterfeiting currency is a minimum
172
term of imprisonment for ten years, life imprisonment, or death.
In Malaysia, cheating is punishable by imprisonment for five years, a
fine, or both. 173 In Canada, the maximum term of imprisonment for
cheating while playing a game or betting is two years. 174 This is
relatively light compared to the five-year sentence imposed in
175
Malaysia for the same offense.
Dionna Taylor categorizes the examples above as irrelevant,
particularly with reference to the Gayle decision in the Tenth
Circuit. 176 In Gayle, the defendant had at least eighteen prior
convictions, enough to warrant characterizing the defendant as
"armed and dangerous." Because the United States tried to use the
defendant's Canadian felonies as predicate offenses under the Gun
Control Act, and because the Tenth Circuit feared the repercussions
that would result by allowing foreign convictions to serve as the basis
for a section 922(g)(1) charge, the court deemed section 922(g)(1)
inapplicable. 1 77 The Canadian system and the felony for which the
defendant was convicted could hardly be colored as unconstitutional
or inimical to the traditional notions of U.S. jurisprudence. The U.S.
Supreme Court must determine whether situations like Gayle are the
exception or the rule when it hears Small.

V. MADE IN THE U.S.A.: SIMILAR STATUTORY SCHEMES IN STATE LAW

An issue similar to the problem raised by foreign convictions is
raised by state repeat-offender laws. These laws provide harsher
penalties to repeat criminal offenders than to first-time offenders
and, in many cases, the statutory language is arguably as ambiguous
178
as 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1).

172.
Decision on Punishment of Crimes Disrupting Financial Order, No. 127,
Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China, The Laws of the People's Republic of China
(1998) (adopted June 30, 1995).
173.
Penal Code, 1997 (Act 574.417), Laws of Malaysia, Golden's Federal
Statutes (2003).
174.
See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 209 (1985) ("Every one who, with
intent to defraud any person, cheats while playing a game or in holding the stakes for a
game or in betting is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years.").
175.
See Penal Code, supra note 173.
176.
See Taylor, supra note 69, at 787 (the use of foreign convictions does not
lead to absurd results).
177.
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
178.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-10.1 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-604 (2004);
CAL. PENAL CODE §

9 9 9

tit. 11, § 4214 (2004).

e (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN.
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One author reviewed state laws relating to the use of foreign
felony convictions as sentence enhancers and suggested that foreign
felony convictions ought to be excluded, or at the very least, subject to
strict scrutiny under a "fundamental fairness" standard. 179 Martha
Kimes fond that eight states have laws that explicitly authorize the
consideration of foreign convictions in sentencing, while twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia have statutes that do not allow
the use of foreign convictions.1 80 The remaining jurisdictions either
have ambiguous statutes or are silent regarding the use of foreign
felony convictions.18 1 This analysis is useful because it highlights the
same problems faced by federal courts in deciding whether to allow
foreign felonies to serve as sentence enhancers under section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act.
In the case of People v. Braithwaite, the Michigan Court of
Appeals noted that "since many foreign convictions do not provide due
process rights equivqlent to those existing in the United States, it
would be manifestly unfair to allow foreign felony convictions to be
considered in sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime in this
country." 18 2 The Braithwaite court noted that the same decision

179.
Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Convictions Under
American Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in
DeterminingHabitualCriminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503 (1997).
180.
Id. at 507 (Kimes' note details a comprehensive survey of how states treat
foreign felony convictions); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 668 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch.
775.084(1)(d) (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:529.1(A) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 609.1095 (1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 54 (2003);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-106(b)(5) (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120(e)(4) (2003);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (2003). But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(1)-(2) (1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (2003); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-1804a (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (2003); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3
(2004) (previous version held unconstitutional by Illinois Supreme Court); IOWA CODE §
902.8 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 9-A (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, §
25 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-81 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221(1) (2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1(a) (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17(A) (2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-7.1 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1)(c) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.01(JJ) (Anderson 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(3)-(4) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
12-19-21(a) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-7 (Michie 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 763-407, 408 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1(B) (2003); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18
(2003).
181.
See Kimes, supra note 179, at 509.
182.
See generally People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
The Michigan law at issue, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10 (1974), was revised numerous
times, and the current version is as follows:
(1) If a person has been convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony,
whether the conviction occurred in this state or would have been for a felony or
attempt to commit a felony in this state if obtained in this state, and that
person commits a subsequent felony within this state.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10 (2003). This statute modifies the earlier statute and
attempts to limit foreign felony convictions able to be used to those which occurred
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could not have been reached if the same defendant were prosecuted
under U.S. law.1 8 3 As a solution, the Michigan Court of Appeals
decided that rather than have sentencing courts examine the laws of
foreign jurisdictions to determine whether they fit with traditional
U.S. notions of due process ("a burdensome, difficult, and often
impossible task"), courts should simply never consider foreign felony
convictions when determining sentencing. 184 This decision is an
outlier when compared to similar federal decisions that do not treat
the issue in such unambiguous terms. 185 The reasoning behind the
Braithwaite decision, as well as other cases dealing with foreign
convictions under habitual criminal statutes, nonetheless illustrates
the problems inherent when dealing with foreign convictions in
domestic courts.
Another reason against the use of foreign felony convictions as
sentence enhancers is the differing nature of what constitutes a crime
from country to country. As Kimes argues, "[b]ecause some countries
display a much more punitive policy than others by criminalizing
more behaviors and prosecuting violations of the law more
aggressively, the use of foreign convictions to enhance sentences
invites arbitrary, distinctions in punishment simply based on whether
a defendant happens to have committed a prior crime in a country
18 6
with strict, rather than lenient, policies.
Scholars have addressed the due process and constitutionality
concerns raised by Braithwaite and other state decisions. Kimes, in
particular, agrees with the Braithwaite court, arguing that it would
be a difficult and arguably impossible task for a court to determine
whether a foreign conviction was obtained by a procedure that is
comparable to the U.S. procedures that protect the right of due
process.1 8 7 While difficulty alone should not preclude courts from

outside the state, which, however, would have been considered felonies had they
occurred within the state. This arguably leaves open the possibility that a foreign
felony could be used as a sentence enhancer, so long as that felony is also a felony
within the state.
183.
Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d at 294.
184.

Id.

185.
See, e.g., supra Part II (for an in-depth discussion regarding the federal
cases which have dealt with this issue).
See Kimes, supra note 179, at 519. The author notes that France has a
186.
much less punitive attitude toward crime than the United States, and also
automatically expunges convictions automatically after a set period of time if the
offender has no new convictions. Id. This could further lead to disparate treatment
when, for example, a person previously convicted of a felony in France and a different
person convicted of a felony in Italy are being tried under § 922(g)(1) for sentence
enhancement, and the French felon's convictions have been expunged. Id.; see Richard
S. Frase, Sentencing Laws & Practices in France, 7 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 275-77 (1995).
187.
Kimes, supra note 179, at 521-22; see also People v. Gaines, 341 N.W.2d
519, 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (The inquiry into the law of a jurisdiction to determine
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conducting this examination, the current backlog of cases in courts
may prevent such an undertaking from occurring. The Restatement
188
approach would, however, allow courts the option to do so.
The opposite conclusion with regard to foreign felony convictions
was reached in two separate law review articles. 189 Alex Glashausser
argues that consideration of foreign convictions advances the same
goals of recidivism statutes, rather than hindering them. 190
Recidivism statutes aim at levying harsher punishments on those
previously convicted of a felony. Glashausser notes that "[o]ne who
violates laws in another country is just as dangerous in the future as
one who violates laws in the United States and is therefore equally in
need of rehabilitation." 191 In addition, he notes that the simple fact
that the previously convicted felon has committed another crime is
evidence of his criminal tendencies. 192 This approach, however, is at
odds with the "innocent until proven guilty" doctrine of the U.S.
judicial system and certain Federal Rules of Evidence that limit the
use of prior crimes as character evidence to prove that a person who
previously committed a crime has a tendency to commit other
193
crimes.

VI. CORRECTING THE PROBLEM

Because of the significant possibility that courts might infringe
on the constitutional rights of both potential and existing gun owners,
the U.S. Supreme Court should determine that there is ambiguity in
whether section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act should extend to
foreign felonies when it hears Small. The Tenth Circuit's discussion
of the exception from consideration as prior felonies in Gayle of
certain federal and state offenses relating to antitrust violations or
unfair trade practices is evidence that by including federal and state

its fairness will not work out in practice. It does not simply require researching a
single point of foreign law, but instead demands a survey of that country's entire
system of criminal justice in search of the basic components of due process.).
188.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482 (1987); see also Taylor, supra note 69, at 789-94 (suggesting that the burden be
on the party challenging the validity of the foreign conviction [i.e., the defendant] to
show that this felony was obtained through unconstitutional means).
189.
See Glashausser, supra note 103; see also Taylor, supra note 69.
190.
See Glashausser, supra note 103, at 151.
191.
Id. at 155.
192.
Id. ("Even if one presumed a defendant's foreign conviction to be the
product of a foreign society, though, such a presumption should be negated by the first
commission of a felony in the United States.").
193.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979); see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b)
(evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts are not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith).
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but not "foreign" crimes, section 922(g)(1) should not automatically be
presumed to apply to foreign convictions. 194 Such an approach would,
as discussed above from to the Malaysian and Chinese statutes,
result in differing treatment for felonies committed abroad than for
felonies committed in the United States. This would enhance the
discrepancy between domestic and foreign felonies, rather than
195
support a conclusion that such felonies should be treated similarly.
As the Gayle court noted:
[Congress] would in all likelihood have been troubled by the question
whether the prohibition should apply to those convicted by procedures
and methods that did not conform to minimum standards of justice and
those convicted of crimes that are anathema to our First Amendment
freedoms, such as convictions for failure to observe the commands of a
19 6
mandatory religion or for criticism of government.

Real ambiguity does exist with regard to the scope of section 922(g)(1)
of the Gun Control Act. One solution to the problem of varying
degrees of punishment for the same crime would be to have one truly
international criminal code, with the same punishments applicable in
all countries.
This approach is explored in articles by Violeta
Balan 197 and Karen E. Minehan. 198 Currently, several treaties
address the problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. 199 The Hague Conference on Private International Law
attempted to negotiate a multilateral judgments agreement that
20 0
included a public policy exception similar to the Restatement.
20 1
While the United States is a signatory to the Hague Conference,
there is no indication that any of the recent Hague Conventions have
resolved the section 922(g)(1) interpretation problem.
While an international agreement may solve the section
922(g)(1) problem, this alternative would also require a massive
restructuring of the judicial systems of all nations and would erode
the uniqueness and independence of each nation's judiciary because

194.
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2003).
195.
While such white-collar criminals may not have been the target of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, not excluding the same foreign offenses from the scope does little
to advance that distinction. Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Violeta I. Balan, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in the United States: The Need for Federal Legislation, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 229 (2003).
198.
Minehan, supra note 151, at 795.
199.

See, e.g., UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT Prefatory Note

(revised 1964), 13 Part I U.L.A. 156 (2002); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, 13
Part II U.L.A. 39 (2002).
200.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 482 (1987); see also Hague Convention on PrivateInternationalLaw, Oct. 19,
1996, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/text34e.html.
201.
See H.R.J. Res. 778, 88th Cong. (1963).
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some activities are not criminal in all nations. Such a solution would
likely force all nations to either accept as criminal those previously
non-criminal activities, or declare those activities legal. This would
raise much political debate and certainly cause more problems than it
would solve, and therefore is not the best solution.
In addition, the United States' reluctance to join the
International Criminal Court because of fears that the tribunal will
prosecute U.S. citizens for purely political reasons underscores the
increased politicization of the judiciary. 202 The use of courts
anywhere, including the International Criminal Court, to harass or
otherwise interfere with the effective operation of a nation's
government is a serious concern, and one that the U.S. Supreme
Court should consider when it decides whether section 922(g)(1) of
the Gun Control Act should extend to include foreign felony
convictions as predicate offenses.
Effective alternatives include (1) upholding the Custis court's
decision to remove the power of judicial review of foreign convictions
for purposes of section 922;203 (2) the approach suggested by the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
482, which would allow (and at times mandate) judicial nonrecognition of a foreign felony if a court determines that a conviction
was obtained through means at odds with U.S. notions of due process
and jurisprudence; 20 4 or (3) passage of legislation clarifying Congress'
20 5
intent, thus solving the interpretation problem once and for all.
A. Removing the Power of Judicial Review of Foreign Convictions
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Custis impeded the ability
of lower courts to review the fairness of previous convictions. 20 6 The
Custis decision provided that persons convicted may only challenge

202.
See Diane Marie Amann, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVITH International Congress of
Comparative Law: Section IV The United States of American and the International
Criminal Court, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 381, 386 (2002) (citing the statement of Senator
Rod Grams before the International Operations Subcommittee of the U.S. Foreign
Relations Committee (July 23, 1998), available at 1998 WL 12762521 [hereinafter
Grams statement]). "The International Criminal Court prosecutor will have the power
to initiate prosecutions without a referral from the Security Council or state parties.
There will be no effective screen against politically motivated prosecutions from being
brought forward." Grams statement at 10.
203.
See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 485; see also supra text
accompanying notes 40-41; infra text accompanying notes 227-31.
204.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482; see also infra Part VI.B.
205.
See supra text accompanying notes 142-44; see also supra Part III.B.1 for a
discussion of pending legislation on this statute in the House.
206.
See Custis, 511 U.S. at 485; see also supra note 38.
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their convictions on habeas corpus review. 20 7 As the Concha court
noted, challenging these foreign convictions is itself a difficult
undertaking. 20 8 At the state level, the Michigan Court of Appeals
agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Braithwaite, noting that
challenging such foreign convictions is a "burdensome, difficult, and
often impossible task. '209 The fact that materials may be in a foreign
language is an obvious source of difficulty. Little documentation may
be available on the precise judicial methods employed in the trial, or
records may not have been kept, making a determination of whether
a specific trial was handled impartially or with due process difficult.
As such, courts should simply not consider foreign felony
convictions. 210 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Michigan Court
of Appeals agreed that this difficulty alone may be dispositive of the
issue of whether to include foreign felony convictions at all.
Consequently, potential defendants would be able to challenge
their foreign convictions on habeas corpus review prior to obtaining a
firearm. These defendants may not, however, be aware that their
rights were in any way violated in the foreign proceedings. Courts
would be in a better position to review whether the foreign judicial
proceedings met the constitutional guarantees required in U.S.
judicial proceedings. The Concha and Braithwaite courts, however,
assert that this burden on courts is both difficult and timeconsuming.211 Shifting the burden to the defendants, as Taylor
suggests, would be consistent with the habeas standard; 212 however,
as Taylor also notes, "a foreign court system may not allow persons to
attack and overturn their convictions. Even if it were possible, the
time and expense to seek such relief would surely be an impossible
obstacle to overcome for the criminal who is serving time in a United
'2 13
States prison.
The Restatement approach, as adopted by the Third Circuit in
Small,2 14 would expressly allow a court to consider the process by
which these foreign convictions were obtained. 215 Doing so would
allow courts to decline to recognize these foreign convictions if it were
determined that they were obtained in violation of due process, or on
other public policy grounds.2 16 Removing the power of review from
the courts and declaring that all foreign convictions are irrelevant for

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212,
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Custis, 511 U.S. at 485.
See United States v. Concha, 223 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000).
People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 231-35.
See infra text accompanying notes 231-35.
See Taylor, supra note 69, at 789-94.
Id. at 790.
See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 425 (3d Cir. 2003).
See infra Part VI.B.
See id. for a discussion of when a court may set aside a foreign judgment.
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purposes of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act is not the best
approach. As the Tenth Circuit noted, even though they are
"innocent until proven guilty," "foreign criminals are likely to be as
dangerous as domestic criminals." 217 Glasshauser agreed, finding
that foreign convictions are evidence of criminal tendencies. 218
Therefore, removing foreign felony convictions from the scope of
section 922(g)(1) or limiting a court's ability to review the validity of
these convictions does not advance section 922(g)(1)'s policy goal of
and is not a workable
removing handguns from convicted felons,
219
solution to the interpretation problem.
B. Restatement Approach
The current Restatement approach allows courts to disregard
foreign felony convictions if they determine, for example, that the
220
convictions were obtained in an unfair or unconstitutional manner.
Giving courts this discretion, however, may not be the best solution,
as different courts may reach different conclusions based on the same
In
disputed criminal proceeding from any particular country.
addition, as both the Tenth Circuit in Concha and the Michigan Court
of Appeals in Braithwaite noted, oftentimes these courts are not in a
position to review comprehensively and fairly the methods employed
by the foreign courts.
These potential problems aside, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482 may be a workable
approach to square the problems inherent in foreign felony
convictions with the public policy goals of the ACCA and the Gun
Control Act. 2 2 1 The Restatement sets forth two mandatory grounds
and six discretionary grounds for courts to disregard foreign
judgments. This approach was adopted recently by the Third Circuit
in the Small case. 222 The Restatement approach mandates that:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the
court of the foreign state if:

217. United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
218. Glashausser, supra note 103, at 151.
219. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the public policy goals of the Act.
220. See United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1982).
221.
See Taylor, supra note 69. While reaching an opposite conclusion from
Taylor, both articles agree that the Restatement approach adopted by the Gayle court
may be the best method to balance the concerns of an outright non-recognition of
foreign felonies against the potential for unconstitutional convictions to be used to
unnecessarily and unlawfully deprive an individual of his right to possess a firearm.

Id.
222.

United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003).
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(a)

the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process of law; or

(b)

the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant in accordance with the law of the
rendering state and with the rules set forth in § 421.

A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
(a)
(b)

the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the action;
the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in
sufficient time to enable him to defend;

(c)

the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(d)

the cause of action on which the judgment was based or the
judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United
States or of the State where recognition is sought;

(e)

the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is
entitled to recognition; or

(f)

the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to agreement
between the parties to submit the controversy on which the
2 23
judgment is based to another forum.

Issues (2)(a)-(c) and (e)-(f) all deal with matters of civil
procedure, rules which are concrete and easily applied. 224 The
comments to Restatement § 482 give situations where a court would
be likely to apply these grounds. 225 Such situations may include
instances where the judiciary was dominated by a political branch or
where certain classes of individuals are treated unequally, as the
Jews in Germany were under the Nazi Party in the 1930s and
1940s.226

The first two provisions require a court to disregard a foreign
judgment, whereas the following six provisions are discretionary.

223.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482 (1987).
224.
For example, the Supreme Court ruled that a fair procedure under 482(b)
would include:
[O]pportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of
its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was
sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the
comity of this nation should not allow it full effect.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
225.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482 cmts. (1987).
226.
Id.
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Courts would have wide latitude to decide whether any of the
provisions are met. Giving the courts such discretion, however, may
invite inconsistent interpretations of foreign convictions or foreign
statutes.
The primary concern that arises in the context of section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act is the Restatement's suggestion in
(2)(d). The comments to (2)(d) indicate that foreign judgments for
causes of action that are not justiciable in the United States are still
to be given full effect. 227 Arguing for enforcement of foreign
judgments for which no domestic cause of action exists is a very
ambiguous standard for courts to apply.' It essentially forces upon a
court the responsibility of deciding what, exactly, domestic public
policy should be-an activist role many oppose courts and judges from
taking. Thus, U.S. courts would presumably be required to give effect
to felony status that the Chinese statute prohibiting flag burning
would impute, even though there is currently only limited prohibition
of such an act within the United States and would not be considered a
felony. 228 Moreover, while the Restatement approach gives courts
wide latitude to consider the judicial processes of a foreign court
when determining whether a foreign conviction satisfies the statute,
229
this latitude may open the potential for misuse or abuse.
As the Small decision indicates, this also unfortunately imposes
the added burden of requiring the parties to show that the foreign
conviction was either intrinsically fair or unfair, which could add
substantially to the cost of litigation.2 30 This may be at odds with the
Custis approach of only attacking prior convictions in habeas
proceedings. In addition, in cases in which the defendant is being
represented by a public defender, the costs could be prohibitive.
Many courts are familiar with the judicial systems of the United
States, but foreign systems may be much more difficult to
This will add further to the length of judicial
understand.

227.

See, e.g., Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D. 2d 438, 439 (1958).

While the judgment of a foreign court is not entitled to the full faith and credit
constitutionally required to be accorded to the judgments of another state,
under principles of comity we will recognize and enforce private rights acquired
under valid foreign judgments provided they are jurisdictionally well founded
and not contrary to our public policy.
Id. at n.225. The reporter's note to (2)(d), however, indicates that judgments
implementing racial laws would, however, probably not be enforced. The discrepancy
between enforcing laws which, although not contrary to public policy, are not a cause of
action in the United States while not enforcing judgments which are causes of action in
the U.S. should not be overlooked. Id.
228. See supra, note 168.
229.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482 (1987).
United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003).
230.
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proceedings and increase the cost to both the defendant and U.S.
taxpayers.
While there arguably is not a price to liberty (or,
alternatively, an exceedingly high price), many citizens may not see it
23 1
this way.
C. Additional Legislation to Clarify CongressionalIntent
Because of the confusion that already exists regarding the
statutory language of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act, action
by Congress to clarify the intended meaning of the statute represents
the best solution. Congressional clarification could come in the form
of Congress adopting the current amendment that is pending 232 or
through legislation narrowing section 922(g)(1)'s applicability to
domestic convictions.

231.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) may allow the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
to review foreign felony convictions in a manner similar to the Restatement. While
outside the scope of this Note, similar problems are faced by felons with foreign
convictions under §§ 922, 924:
It is difficult to argue with the contention that an individual who has
committed violent crimes in a foreign country is less likely to be a threat than
someone who committed the same crime in the United States. Cases that have
dealt with the issue of foreign convictions in the context of firearms disabilities
almost always involve defendants convicted of serious crimes in those
countries.
While courts recognize that a foreign conviction may have been obtained in
violation of the defendant's civil rights or contrary to [a] cherished principle of
American constitutional law, they have relied upon 925(c) as the method by
which a foreign felon can assert that his conviction was unlawfully obtained.
This should be done, the Supreme Court noted, before the foreign felon
attempts to obtain a firearm.
The relief provision, by its terms, is broad enough to fully assay the validity of a
foreign conviction, and the necessity of imposing firearms disabilities. The ATF
can take into account that a foreign felony conviction was for a relatively minor
offense by American standards. This was the case with Bean's conviction. It
was also significant that the crime was eventually reduced to a misdemeanor.
The crime with which Bean was charged in Mexico may not have required
mens rea, a fundamental element of felonies in the United States.
The ATF could also consider the means used to obtain the conviction, i.e.,
whether it was obtained in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness or
basic notions of due process. Such an inquiry would include an examination of
the conduct of foreign officials during the investigative stage of the criminal
proceedings, as well as during the trial stage. For example, a confession may
have been obtained through subterfuge, brutality, or other questionable
methods. The ATF could also consider whether the sentence and subsequent
punishment comported with evolving standards of human decency.
Mark M. Stavsky, Symposium, No Guns or Butter for Thomas Bean: Firearms
Disabilitiesand Their Occupational Consequences, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1759, 180304 (2003).
232. • See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
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Even though the confusion that resulted from Congress'
amendment to the Safe Streets Act with the ACCA was somewhat
resolved, the split among the circuits endured, confirming that
confusion still remains. 233 Therefore, should Congress decide to pass
new legislation or clarify its purpose, it will be important during
conference for Congress to consider this issue.
In addition, because of the cultural and political differences
inherent in executing a reciprocal treaty, the United States has so far
declined to enter into an international reciprocal treaty governing the
While
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 234
impractical, such an arrangement would solve the ambiguity problem
by placing foreign judgments on par with judgments obtained in U.S.
courts.
The current approach of reading congressional intent into a
statute is not the best method of statutory interpretation, because it
has generated a circuit split. A plain-meaning reading would be the
best alternative. Therefore, if Congress were to amend Title VII, it
should add a clarifying term to modify "in any court" to read either
"in any court of the United States" or, if Congress did in fact intend
the statute to apply to all predicate convictions, domestic and foreign,
perhaps "in any court of the world."

VII. SETTING THE SIGHTS A BIT "SMALLER": APPLYING THE SOLUTION
TO THE SMALL CASE

Presumably, if the U.S. Supreme Court adopts the standards set
forth in the Restatement's § 482, the decision of the Small court will
be upheld. There may be no standing to challenge the applicability of
section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act to a potentially
unconstitutional foreign felony conviction because the defendant in
Small apparently did not suffer any of the injuries certain foreign
felony proceedings might produce. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme
Court may decline to rule on whether foreign felonies as a class
should categorically be excluded from the scope of section 922(g)(1) of
the Gun Control Act.
If the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the decision of the Small
court on the basis that the defendant's foreign conviction was
obtained through means that did comport with U.S. due process, the
question of what courts should do when confronted with potentially

233.
See Jerald J. Director, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Provisionof Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C.A. Appx.
§ 1202(a)(1)) Making It Federal Offense For Convicted Felon to Possess Firearm, 13
A.L.R. FED. 103 (1972).
Paige, supra note 151, at 622; see also Balan, supranote 197, at 229-31.
234.
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unconstitutional foreign felony convictions would remain unresolved.
This decision would essentially leave the debate open and the circuit
split untouched. It seems a likely outcome in Small, because while
the defendant did commit a crime that arguably would also be a crime
if committed in the United States (shipping what was purported to be
a hot water heater across state lines, when-actually the package
allegedly contained pistols, a rifle, and ammunition), the Japanese
constitution under which the Japanese court operated afforded the
defendant essentially the same protections that:the U.S. Constitution
provides. 235 The defendant, however, did not have a.right to a jury
trial, and the defendant was not able to cross-examine several
witnesses who gave sworn, written statements against the
defendant. 23 6 In addition, the defendant refused to testify, and this
silence was purported to be an indication of guilt by the prosecuting
attorney, a conclusion that conflicts with the Fifth Amendment's
"right to remain silent.' '23 7
Given the problems raised by Small, the best outcome would be
for the U.S. Supreme Court to either (1) uphold the Small decision on
the basis that the language of section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act
is unambiguous and the Restatement approach adequately affords
protection to citizens with foreign felony convictions or (2) find that
section 922(g)(1) is unambiguous and remove individuals with foreign
felony convictions from the scope of section 922(g)(1) altogether. This
Note has found section 922(g)(1) ambiguous, siding with the Gayle
court. While firearm use by previously convicted felons is a problem,
the greater problem of depriving individuals of liberty by
unconstitutionally recognizing convictions of foreign tribunals
outweighs the potential problem of foreign felons obtaining and using
firearms.

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is unclear whether Congress intended section 922(g)(1) of the
Gun Control Act to apply only to domestic felonies or to include
foreign felony convictions. 2 38 The legislative history of section 921
and section 1202, and the subsequent merger of the two Acts, sheds
no light on Congress' intention. As the world becomes more socially
and commercially integrated, there will likely be an increase in
foreign felons traveling to and from the United States.
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Moreover, in a post-September 11 world, there is increased
pressure on all branches of the government to prevent dangerous or
potentially dangerous individuals from entering the United States.
Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act could be interpreted to cover
foreign felonies for this purpose. Congress did not have this purpose
in mind when it passed the Gun Control Act, however. The U.S.
Supreme Court should not necessarily read a different intent into the
Gun Control Act solely because the circumstances facing the country
today make it appealing to do so-particularly when important
constitutional rights are at issue.
Overall, while some foreign felons are as dangerous as domestic
felons, especially for the purpose of possessing firearms, the concerns
of protecting due process, of labeling foreign convictions as "felonies,"
and of allowing foreign felony convictions to serve as the predicate
offense for section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act are the
determinative issues that must be addressed. Should "full faith and
credit" be given to foreign convictions in all circumstances, in some
circumstances, or in no circumstances? This depends on whether the
same constitutional protections guaranteed by U.S. courts are
guaranteed to those charged and convicted abroad. As the discussion
of the judicial systems of China, Malaysia, and Palestine shows, there
are different standards of justice around the world.
The Restatement approach allows the reviewing court to
examine the foreign conviction on a case-by-case basis and thus is a
all foreign felonies from
better solution than excluding
consideration. 239 Unfortunately, this may lead to an inconsistent line
of decisions by different courts as to whether certain nations' systems
do, in fact, comport with the U.S. system of justice.
Therefore, since section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act is
ambiguous, and since a case-by-case basis may lead to injustice
through inconsistency, the best solution would be to confine the scope
of section 922(g)(1) to domestic felonies until Congress properly
addresses the issue. Doing so will prevent courts from unjustly
infringing on the Second Amendment right to bear arms2 40 and will
ensure that constitutional concerns override any automatic
acceptance by U.S. courts of foreign convictions without review.
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